US leaders have identified irregular threats as a major challenge facing the United States over the next few decades. While other US military services are responding to these threats, the US Air Force is falling short in preparing for irregular warfare. Although the US Air Force must balance its capabilities to address all potential threats, including major combat operations, the service has not mentally prepared to focus on the role that airpower plays in irregular conflict.This study examines the requirement for an irregular air warfare organization and compares past USAF advisory efforts, specifically the early 1960s Special Air Warfare Center and US Air Force actions to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force, to identify the essential missions and optimum organizational structure for such an organization. This research has found that the USAF has not formulated irregular warfare strategy, doctrine, and tactics; has not captured and utilized irregular warfare lessons learned; has not assisted partners with military technology exploitation and integration; and has not provided a focal point for aviation advisory assistance. To fulfill these mission areas the author proposes reestablishing a USAF Special Air Warfare Center in Air Force Special Operations Command. This would gain synergy from the major command's Combat Aviation Advisory unit and further support its congressionally-legislated mission of foreign internal defense. This center would focus on how to best apply airpower to global irregular conflict.Recently the US Air Force established the Coalition Irregular Warfare Center at Nellis AFB to address irregular warfare doctrine and provide recommendations to senior leadership. While this center does address some strategic issues required by the USAF, it does not address the critical functions that this thesis has identified. This center's growth is important, but it should focus on analyzing how to apply current USAF general purpose forces to irregular warfare. While